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Thoughts on Scheer, With Enough Shovels

Warnke interview:

Summer, 1981: "We're getting to this point at which both sides are developing this CF capability. (True: in Fifties, nothing strategic for us to attack, nothing they could attack us with; "stable" (except for SAC belief they had targets, and they were vulnerable!); Rostow points to their new accuracy in 80s.

If LOW, "then a nuclear war could start because of panic, not because of any kind of rational calculation of advantage, but just the idea that at least I'm going to diminish this other guy's ability to destroy me." [even though it won't—diminish his ability to destroy—just reduce the excessive weapons he has to do it.

[Just as LB] and N had vastly more troops in VN than needed to hold on, they had a lot to reduce—without diminishing their ability to hold on (they couldn't win even with twice as many).

"We're still talking as though the **use of military force** against the SU, or Soviet use of military force against us, is a conceivable way of implementing national objectives. And the nuclear age has changed that...everything but our way of thinking. (Einstein) We still talk in Clausewitzian terms as though war is the continuation of diplomacy by other means. That's no longer the case, and it never will be again, unless you're talking about low-level conflicts between superpowers and the Third World. But if you talk about a war between the US and the SU, it's going to mean that neither one of will be a superpower anymore. [I.e., rather, neither will exist as societies, nor anyone else.] (Down to distant prehistoric levels]

[But what has turned out to be still a continuation of diplomacy with an admixture of other means is the THREAT of "limited" or all-out nuclear war between the US and Russia (or others): even though that threat involves a real RISK of such a war (with a confrontation getting out of "rational" centralized control, or even leaders choosing war "irrationally." Such threats have continued to be the currency of diplomacy, backed up by elaborate, expensive machinery to carry them out (even though doing so could not be "rational," better than alternatives.)

Eugene Rostow: He won't say there is a "prospect" of a Soviet surprise attack, but a "potentiality." Potentiality for a "rational" choice of surprise attack? (They could always have attacked, say in 1961 with their 4 ICBMs.) But could they hope to attack with near-impunity (or even, with less destruction than if they were attacked)? They could destroy our ICBMs (maybe) (and subs in port, C3, many bombers): doing the job we should have done unilaterally almost twenty years earlier, in terms of the ICBMs. So what? "Our SLBMs are not as accurate." (Then)

So what? They've already fired most of their hard-target missiles that require accuracy; **our SLBMs threaten as much destruction to their soft targets, cities, as their larger-yield, accurate weapons remaining, or for that matter, as much as they threatened to begin with! What hard US targets remain for them to threaten, after their first strike? So what in the world does their larger megatonnage do for them? (That's why we didn't bother to buy it).**

Well, they might "think" that their asymmetrical "superiorities"—or just, our lack of superiority (as in 1962)-- make their risks less in "provocative" actions: we won't be as willing to confront them, because we think they might believe they will be immune... But that means we think they're paying no attention to any realistic, objective, estimate of the damage they'd suffer if we did respond...that they've lost their mind..

(Well, Reagan, Pipes, Jones, etc. did talk that way! Might they not think the same?)

But responding by building our own FS weapons (as we were doing BEFORE they built theirs, no?---what were the sequences of announcements about MX, Trident II, ALCMs...and SS-18, etc."

What have the Soviets gained by their buildup? What is at risk for us to lose? (Berlin was not an issue any more): Iran! And the Persian Gulf!

✓ Rostow implies that we "lost Iran" because of shift in nuclear balance with SU (WHAT?) We were less willing to intervene (Carter) because SU missiles were getting more accurate, a threat to MM...(!!!) (207: at least Scheer interprets him as implying that) R: "we weren't as happy to send in troops to Iran as we were in Korea" !!!

[Nitze-Reagan (late Carter) talked as if the SU buildup to parity (more ICBM warheads when they MIRVd, five years after we did; many less SLBM warheads; 30% of our force on land, 75% of theirs) had to be responded to by us, as if we could get back to the "superiority" (virtual strategic **monopoly**, ignoring threat to Europe) of "Korea" (1950) or "Cuba" (1962): and as if even that did a lot for us! (except on Berlin)

Only FU/FS threats kept Berlin (not really needed to keep West Europe). Note that in September 1961 I didn't learn that the 22 SU divisions in East Germany, 7 near Berlin, were a myth (like the 100 or 200 ICBMs, or the German nuclear program, or the bomber gap, or Saddam's WMDs in 2003 (his CW in 1991 wasn't a myth!). So it remained true that only our nuc threats held Berlin: and even I turned immediately to those to resolve the crisis, in my memos to JFK!

[on coercive strategy by SU: McN says that it's "absurd" to think that SU would feel sure, after dumping 2000 1-megaton ground-bursts (lost of fallout, not much

smoke) on MM that a President wouldn't respond for fear of his cities now being destroyed. But the balance of destructive power against cities would be the same as it was before the attack. Our land-based ICBMs, which had just been destroyed, weren't needed or designed (with their accuracy and larger yield) for threatening cities. (Nor were their heavy ICBMs, which had just mostly been used!)

McN: the SU would know that the President "might" respond: "and I am convinced he would." (Quite reliable; especially, as McN says, it wouldn't even be the president but some underling surviving, military...) But why? To what effect? What would be the rational reason by initiating a city exchange? Yes, it would be virtually certain, but not because it would be even slightly rational. It would be for revenge (at cost of national survival), for routine, orders, panic: hardly unexpected under conditions of huge nuclear attack! (On C3 as well: i.e., on many US cities! Were the CPD really forecasting a SU attack that withheld against all US C3 and other targets in cities?! Ha ha. (Yes, that was my thought, even second strike (and perhaps, if SU were rational, in their FS. Fat chance, on either side.

BUT: Is it, even remotely, "rational" to respond to a nuclear attack, when the response offers no hope whatever of reducing damage, reducing real possibility of damage, improving (not worsening) the post-attack situation? Consider why it's so obvious, as McN says, that an irrational response to a 2000-MT attack is to be expected. (Whereas: a commitment to respond **irrationally** -self-destructively-- to a conventional attack on Europe, **sparing cities (which IS possible in a non-nuclear attack, not nuclear)** is less to be relied on

Why not have the option, plan for the possibility, however slight: the only chance to come out alive (like decap itself!) Because (vs. what is said of Brown on LSR, by Kaplan) "you do NOT always want "more options, the option to so...whatever." A) Sometimes it gives an enemy that you will use that option to withdraw from a commitment or an irrational response, so he can afford to challenge you, defy your threat (TCS). B) Because it raises a FEAR in your enemy (of preemption, or preventive attack) that leads him to arm in ways that reduce security for both, or to seek allies he would otherwise eschew, OR TO PREEMPT, either preventively or in a crisis, on false alarm. (1983) Both sides fell into this trap; both acquired options that increased their dangers, and did them NO good.

Options that increase the probability of nuclear war are not of positive value; they should be avoided, dismantled. (See AWM's accuracy program under Schlesinger/Ford-Nixon for SLBMs, Trident II (which sailed through Congress without challenge, unlike MX, because it was "invulnerable" though it threatened a US CV/FS against SU ICBMs, the bulk of their force). Yes, it was less destabilizing than MX, but it was destabilizing. To no advantage.

What was the advantage of a US FS threat in the 80's? Or a SU FS threat? (Both were acquired). (Except to the labs and services and MIC on both sides: EPT). (And to Reagan getting into office: great).

Even Warnke talked in 1981 about the need to deter/contain Soviet "aggression."
Just when was the SU a real danger of "aggression"? Was it "aggression" for them to hold onto East Europe, by both military and covert means? Well, that could be argued. (To say they had no legitimate concerns or complaints wrt the West, as Rostow clearly does to Scheer, is to ignore Germany as part of "the West"! Especially a rearmed Germany: no basis for complaint?! Possibly nuclear-armed (in fact, de facto!) Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland. Yes, I could go for aggression (This deserves attention. UN Charter attitude at the time, or otherwise?)

BUT: as I said in Lama talks: tenacious in holding on to their empire, their sphere, at whatever risk no doubt. But expansive beyond that? Was their EVER really a realistic danger of that? Did it take nuclear threats to contain it? (Even in Iran, Yugoslavia, Albania, China when it split).

See my Lama discussion, as an alternative view (to my CW perspective).(and my perspective in VN).

Even in Afghanistan (Lama, 1983): holding on to sphere, especially in Central Asia. (not Persian Gulf: is there ANY evidence they saw Afghanistan in those expansionist terms?)

[It's one thing to believe that US C3 can be protected to survive a nuclear attack (in some fashion). (Vance distinguishes that "hope" from having C3 that can fight and prevail in a nuclear war.) Even the first is very problematic. But, as with CF, you can PRETEND to aim at or even to believe that you can do that (**what good is it if you intend and expect to destroy the SU C3?**)

[Was it "inevitable" (Vance) that the SU would seek and achieve rough parity (after 1961)? Without C-II, would K necessarily have sought that (apart from having some solid-fuel ICBMs in silos: SS-7s). They lived without it before. Berlin and C-II "taught" them they needed it: was that inevitable?

In 1982, Warnke and Vance felt they had to defend Carter decisions (not, for Warnke, Pd-59, which he said he hadn't read!) on arms; and McNamara didn't choose to attack them. Big drawback. The Carter arms decisions contradicted everything they thought, just as Reagan's did.

[Problem from beginning, for non-hawks: SU in East Europe (response, which we didn't recognize, to a plausible German threat and German rearmament); SU army, even when not exaggerated (which it was, successfully, without critical challenge); Su rhetoric and ideology, interpreted in US as "world domination" aim; Su "subversion" and use of Parties (with ignorance of US CA); SU reliance on secrecy, vs. inspection (partly to conceal weakness): SU reliance on bluff and boast. Their troops in East Europe, in obvious "satellites," vs. our covert empire (our bases in

regimes not recognized as puppets, “our dictators”) They LOOK like an empire, there, we have benefit of “plausible denial.”

[Nice point: If after WWII, “what if it had been the SU, whose industrial plant was intact, their cities not bombed and destroyed, they had the great unscarred military machine that we had, and they had the bomb and no one else did, would the world be free today? I don’t think so.”]254. Covert/informal/indirect empire is not the worst..]

Team B: Ambiguity of SU buildup as “aiming at FS.” (It wasn’t: but what was it aimed at? Probably same motives as ours: institutional, and D-L logic: highly flawed, same as ours. And as McN said, ours presented the same picture to SU (and accurately, wrt. USAF!) (It was true of his program, though less than what USAF wanted!)

“If war comes, what do you want to do with your weapons? What do you target? (A)W attacks targeting cities: which was never emphasized after MAD than before). The real alternative, never discussed or even imagined: Total withholding, don’t target anything! (But do you tell them—and your own troops, and your hawks—that? Could you say: We’ll decide then? And explicitly, or implicitly, hold out an “irrational” response (as McN does to Scheer).

Vance: “Continued increase of SU forces, a fact, didn’t mean they were going for a FS.” A SOVIET ERROR: did it have any benefit whatever for them? (“Arms control negotiations”—prestige, as equal.)

[Thus: both Carter and the Soviets contributed to our past and present dangers.]

(Vance feels he has to agree that there was an element of “betrayal” of détente by Soviets.227 Did he really believe tthat?

S: “Do you think in retrospect that we might have exaggerated the Soviet betrayal as far as Afghanistan is concerned? The President called it the gravest crisis since WWII, the attempt to link it with Iran and the emotional feeling about Iran.”

[Note: the real “loss” by Carter was Iran—nothing to do with the Soviets! (Vs. CW paradigm!) Confronted Carter with “need” for direct US involvement in Persian Gulf: for which he needed a rationale, which Afghan provided. (like 9-11/Iraq)

[CF Afganistan and Putin’s “aggression” in Crimea now, and Ukraine.]

V: disagrees (with Carter) that it was the gravest crisis since WWII. I think it was a very important and a very serious step backwards, which clearly poisoned the relationships between our country and the SU. It was a very brutal act on the part of the Soviets, which I see no justification for.” (what did he think of Brz memos to Carter?_

REAGAN: R puts weight on SU violating the spirit of MAD (no defense), not with ABM but with a big CD program. **(Did TK Jones' view actually lead to any CD program in US?** (If that had been real, it could have been a real indicator favoring the Pipes' view. Practiced evacuation. (Really?) Recall Goure, and subway.

[Afghanistan played the same role for CPD/Carter and Reagan that Crimea (and Ukraine) does now for us. Evidence that the Russian leader is confident, aggressive, expansionist, testing us, believes he is stronger than before and can afford to challenge us, partly based on strategic nuclear strength, which he is increasing. Interestingly, in both cases, the Russian move was actually preceded and in considerable part provoked by US covert action! (Did we want Putin to go into Crimea? In any case, wasn't it foreseeable?)

R implies that SU heavy ICBMs put them in a position to say to us "surrender or die" over the telephone—after eliminating our ICBMs (e.g., MX!), many bombers, subs in port. I.e., without those, they would be able to say "Surrender or die" because of their threat to our cities—in the face of our (untouched, SLBM) threat to their cities and soft military targets!

(If both sides had nothing but SLBMs, could either say to the other, "surrender or die" over the telephone, if it had greater throw-weight in its SLBM warheads? Neither could credibly threaten FS to protect an ally. Neither would have incentive to preempt. Why would an attacker believe that the opponent would hesitate to respond tit for tat? Or worse? It would have to be based on an imbalance of ruthlessness, unconcern for his own casualties. But if that exists, no need for any kind of superiority in arms in the first place.

R believes that MAD "required" that neither side adopt ABM (or CD). (ABM, even if it didn't work, might be thought by one side that the other thought it would, and it might be motivated to be more reckless, aggressive; or ...etc.

Problem: SU did act—in the same way we had and did—as if it thought a nuclear war "was survivable and winnable" (even if it didn't): and some of its military wrote that way, and may even have believed, as on our side (?):

Andropov was willing to consider preempting even though he didn't (as far as we know) believe it was really winnable or survivable—except in the sense of achieving less total devastation than being struck. (Mistake, in view of nuc winter, that year: 1983. Was that in early 1983, or late?!)

(What difference does nuc winter make? IT OUGHT TO WIPE OUT THOUGHT OF PREEMPTION OR LOW OR LUA (OR RESPONSE AT ALL!) ON BOTH SIDES: and that hadn't happened in SU in 1983, it seems, and it's not clear that it has happened on either side now! And there were dangerous false alarms even in 1995! A WAR BASED ON A FALSE ALARM, NOT EVEN IN A CRISIS, WAS POSSIBLE AND IS

POSSIBLE: THAT IS TOTALLY IRRATIONAL, UNREALISTIC, AND DANGEROUS. And crises do continue, along with nuclear threats and a preparation for preemption on both sides.

YET: a disregard for nuclear winter ("doubt") is still advantageous in preserving the threat of a "rational" preemption, thus the credibility of FS threats (beyond a pure threat of using a DM: which may, after all, be "acceptable" both to leaders on both sides and to the public, even if they do "recognize" that it means nuclear winter.)

Warnke to S: the average person doesn't really know the extent of the danger, OR the consequences of (an escalated) war. (Not only false alarm, but escalation: almost certain, a point of this book!) And the role of threats in crises.

R doesn't acknowledge that "we" (McNamara, Carter) "didn't go along with ABM or CD" not because of MAD "doctrine" or "agreement" but they were both highly expensive (as well as provocative) and **wouldn't work**. (Though Soviets did worry that they'd have to respond to SDI even if they knew it wouldn't work).

AJW 1960 point of view was exactly that of Reagan 1980.

257 R sees Wilson's pledge to keep us out of war as influencing Germany's decision to get into war. **(TR: What was the German, or others' expectation on this? How did it evolve?)**

R also says: Japanese thought we were weak, unprepared. (Some truth to that?) (And Germans, underestimated us? Hitler.) (Is he right at all that the British and French, during the Phony War (which he calls the Cold War) could have advanced into Germany, to Berlin?

S was afraid—he said to R!—of a Reagan presidency because of fear that R would press the button.

That was plausible (Andropov thought so) but was it valid, realistic? He didn't come close to it. But he did come close to provoking/stimulating Andropov to push the button!

The danger of threats, bluffs, the risk of making preparations to make them credible...

One reason R had for fearing Soviet drive for world domination, buildup for the purpose of threatening FS or even carrying it out, nuclear blackmail, wasn't quite peculiar to him, it was a CW demonization of the Soviets that exhibited itself in others (AJW, JCS, Leites) in other forms (Trotskyist...): their godlessness. (See Trump now and religion! And Cruz!)

"It is one of the vital precepts of Communism, tht we are accidents of nature....it gives them less regard for humanity or human beings....There are religious fanatics (Ayatollah) who misuse religion...but Communism..a direct teaching of the child from the beginning of its life that it is a human being whose only importance is its contribution to the state—that they are wards of the state—that they exist only for that purpose, and that there is no God, they are just an accident of nature. The result is, this is why they have no respect for human life, for the dignity of an individual...the Communists are the menace to civilization in the world today...(war is inevitable with them) "unless we, the leader of the free world, maintain the strength that will prevent them from ever daring to take the action which they would plan if they feel we're weak enough."

"Knowing that the SU is following that policy, the belief that such a war can—there can be such a war and that it can be won, we have to build up our deterrent capacity [MX in MM silos!] to the point that they never can see the point at which it could be won. In other words, that damage to themselves would not be unacceptable, and I think we're late in starting that building of our military." [AJW! Ignoring that the weapons he proposed would increase the gap between a SU first and second-strike! As theirs did! Both sides leading Andropov to VRYaN!

COPY 241, on SU "monsters" and surviving a nuclear war. [Note: Andropov saw Reagan and US FS buildup the same way that Reagan saw Andropov and SU: both wrong: results of preemption "acceptable" in 1983! (Reagan not so wrong in believing Andropov capable of preemption or even prevention: not because of his strength—though it reflected CF capability Brezhnev had acquired—not because he was "monstrous" in a sense different from US/JCS, but because he saw Reagan the way Reagan saw him So why didn't Reagan think of preemption—he did! As he told Scheer, openly 241. Same as AJW/JCS/RAND/I saw SU in 1958-62. (see Leites)

But because of their "godlessness" (read: atheism—read "evolutionists"! Scientists!) —they would "accept the prospect or risk of losses in a war that we would not." (see Westmoreland on Vietnamese! Or AJW on their recovery from WWII, as reassuring experience. Like Rostow on Japan and their recovery from nuclear war.)

GHWB also, was attributing SU willingness to invade Afghanistan to trend of their increasing nuclear strength, Carter's early (?) rejection of MX and B-1.

"See, what the MX does is give you an ability to retaliate against hardened sites, and does make the President have the choice of killing people. That is the key to an MX system, because without a platform of that nature you are not going to be able to retaliate against their hardened sites. **[But in retaliating to an SU FS, the MX in fixed silos won't be there; and if it were, only SU reserve ICBMs would be there to be targeted.]** And the President's choice would be at that time, iof our retaliatory capacity were knocked out [MM, MX] his choice would be, "Sir, our retaliatory capabilities have been knocked out, but good news for you, we still have the Polaris boats, nd you can destroy a third of Leningrad and a third of Moscow. Bad news, sir,

is ththey can wipe out, because of their SS-18s, two thirds of Washington," etc. A President shouldn't be faced with only that kind of choice." [Jesus: this is the head of CIA speaking, during the Team B episode, 1979-80! Our SLBMs couldn't threaten as many cities as the SU either before or after the attack!]

YORK: [Did it make any sense at all to talk about megatons beyond what was needed (given accuracy and numbers) to attack hard targets? If the SU had actually destroyed what they could of MM (or MX), what difference does MT make wrt threats on cities? (Just more smoke, to kill themselves with!)]

[R: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." And arms spending, at whatever level by either side, cannot change that. BUT a nuclear war (even with superpowers) can be threatened, has been and still is, and arms spending can affect the credibility of those threats and perhaps their effectiveness, along with rhetoric. And also the risk of war occurring, definitely (without making the war "rational" in any reasonable sense, even if the risk/benefit of threats is regarded as acceptable by some or many, though strongly rejected by others, like me).

[Consider: "a two-sided nuclear war cannot be won or survived and must not be threatened, initiated, or reciprocated." Initiation must not be threatened or prepared for. Between the US and Russia, damage cannot be significantly limited (to allow societal survival or even prevent near-extinction), either by preemption, counterforce, decapitation, coercion, or active or passive defense: nor limited to less than the whole planet.

Yet, a mistaken belief in damage-limiting preemption and counterforce can be plausibly conveyed, and even held, by nation spending massively to achieve it, and thus threats of preemption in the event of ongoing or imminent conflict that may escalate to limited or unlimited nuclear attacks can be deterrent: or they can trigger preemption by the targeted country. Thus, a state of denial (like, a restricted set of options, or an appearance or reality of non-rational decision-making) can be advantageous—and/or catastrophic.

You can't change MAD. But you can change people's acceptance of a risk, and you can deceive them about the risk and the consequences of failure of threats, and you can affect enemies' perceptions of their risks (of your actions). Given that people will and do accept a risk, some risk, even of Doomsday (rather than absolute rejection of it). Still more, of accepting something significantly less than the doom associated with a) being struck, or b) accepting a great "loss."

Bethe: the Russian first-strike would indeed reduce or eliminate (in 1983, before Trident II) our first-strike capability, NOT our second-strike capability! "Retaliating" to a Russian FS with MX or hard-target kill weapons? (First, how do you do it?) This would make some sense for "retaliating" to a Soviet invasion of Europe, with MX, i.e., FS! The Soviets DID greatly reduce our FS capability by "catching up" in the Sixties

and early Seventies: but what good was it, how much did it amount to, after 1965-65? (or was needed?) They didn't reduce our second-strike capability at all, nor could or can they. I.e., it affected Type II Det between 1962-65 but not much after that! Type I not at all! It did not strengthen their "post-attack" ability to coerce or prevail!

[Does Mark Kramer, or anyone else, effectively dispute the PFIAB conclusion about 1983, that Andropov was really worried, and that he contemplated a possible preventive/preemptive attack? And/or 1995? If so, we'd be back to where I was in October last year, and there would be no new or strong reason to worry about 2016-plus being like 1983. Hellman?

Saturday, January 23, 2016

Question: do the nuc postures of US and SU rule out armed conflict between them: i.e., it is to be avoided "at all costs"? (above all, FU): thereby requiring "accommodation" with the SU (by the US itself! Not just our European allies, or SEA), "détente," or an absence of threats and risks of armed conflict? (vs. Reagan)

[Ethical problem: is it acceptable to gamble on a small risk of Greater Evil (nuc winter) to avert a greater risk (perhaps, near-certainty) of a Lesser Evil?

(Presumably the former gamble is not to be accepted when what is to be averted, the alternative, is not Evil, but merely a loss of some sort, or a failure to gain a Good associated with the Greater Evil.

Note: if the first gamble is acceptable, there would be a temptation to choose it really for the Good associated with it, with the pretense that the alternative, which does not promise the Good, does also have associated with it a high likelihood of a (Lesser) Evil. Or some chance, with the preferred alternative having a "much smaller chance" of the Greater Evil.

(e.g., DomRep is invaded, not, supposedly, just to keep out the return of Juan Bosch but to prevent that return from ending by turning the DomRep over to rule by Communists (all 11 of them).

Or the Arbenz regime, or Allende regime, going not "Marxist" but a Soviet Com satellite.

A supposedly Lesser Evil (invasion) is chosen to prevent a small chance of a Greater Evil (Com regime) (but really, to prevent a social democratic, nationalist regime from coming to power by election).

[How to relate the charge Depraved Indifference Murder to the planning for, risking, nuclear war? (The murder, as in the Freddie Gray case, neck broken in the van in Baltimore, follows the existence of Depraved Indifference (Depraved heart), in the preceding treatment of him, the throwing him into the van with the intention of jerking it around, not securing him in the van: none with the definite intent of killing him (or even expectation of it: just not giving a shit).

W

What would be the appropriate charge for having (permitted, prepared, threatened, caused nuclear winter? Or the deaths of 1/3 the human population?

Statements by TK Jones, GHWB, Reagan, on the survivability of nuclear war (with minimal CD) are meant to imply:

Threats to initiate nuclear war (by the US) should be taken seriously by SU, because we know we could survive it; i

it is really conceivable and rational that we would initiate nuclear war as better than some alternatives;

it is rational to prepare to survive nuclear war (that we initiate) by CF (as well as CD)

(NOT, oddly, by lowering SU weapons, or reducing their FS character, by arms agreements! At the cost of lowering the credibility of our own FU/FS threats (WHERE was Reagan inclined to make these, or expected to? In 1983).

We should expect and fear SU-initiated nuclear war, since they are preparing to survive it (CF and CD: neither of these, in fact, did them any good!)

Therefore above measures are needed to warn SU that we might preempt (as Andropov was preparing to do!) (Was there ANY corresponding intelligence warning alert on the US side? As there might well have been!)

Reagan: Modernizing, a trillion dollar military buildup! (Like now! Did JFK do that in current dollars?)

Over-estimates of SU military growth, or CF, ABM, CD,

window of vulnerability, force size, etc. are **not "cautious" or "worst-case" estimates, or a methodological bias or fallacy, but wishful, what "we want to believe." (check "we") xxi**

RS notes that when these mistaken estimates are corrected by intelligence, the programs based on them do not change. (See 1961, MM; MX...

"Plans" on both sides for fighting and winning a nuclear war (and statements, both public and private/classified, that this is achievable) **do not** (I say) prove or even indicate, provide strong evidence, that any leader actually believes this is possible, let alone desirable, or that he has an thought or desire of actually initiating one (or expects the other to do so). The statements, plans and preparations are part of a (deceptive) bargaining process, both with the SU, allies, and Congress and the public (and internal service rivalries).

as (Contrary to Pipes; yet Andropov did believe that Reagan did believe that; and Bethe, with many others, also feared that. Or that Reagan would take aggressive

steps that would risk nuclear war, in the belief that the SU would back down, or if not, that the war could be waged successfully. **Yet Reagan did not take any such steps (did he?): and almost certainly never believed that. (He fooled us, as well as Andropov).**

YET making such plans does maintain and enhance the risk that such a war will take place (as well as, to some extent, deterring incidents and crises that might lead to it; I'm judging that the former impact outweighs the latter, though that's subject to debate, with my opponents pointing out that the war has never yet happened (true, and relevant: but not decisive...) (It suggests that the risk of the war—limited by inertias and resistances—was not **as** likely as I, or Helen Caldicott, thought. But)

As RS says, plausibly, This book is about how our leaders during the time of Ronald Reagan have come **to plan** for waging and winning a nuclear war with the SU, and how they are obsessed with a strategy of confrontation—including nuclear brinksmanship—which aims to force the Soviets to shrink their empire and fundamentally alter their society. P. 3

(Amazingly, their talk and plans did contribute—given Gorbachev—to both of these actually happening in R's second term! At the cost/risk of frightening Andropov into nearly blowing up the world. Brz: big risk, big gain! (Like provoking a war in Afghanistan, at cost of some "riled up Muslims.")

But the Republicans seek to do exactly that, again (thirty years later): shrink Russia's "near abroad" (Ukraine) and change the Putin regime, maybe break up Russia...with the same methods! Including another trillion dollar modernization!

[Q: Was there the smallest truth to the CPD belief that Russians believed that they could survive nuc war with their CD? And that they believed they had or COULD HAVE a "FS capability"? (

Incidentally, the "window of vulnerability" wasn't going to be closed by R programs, reducing vulnerability of land-based ICBMs! On the contrary, he put MX back into MM holes! Rather, he was going to imitate Russian CF capability against (SU) land-based missiles! I.e. he was going to make their vulnerable too! Thus, the "window" was a period in which they alone could eliminate our ICBMs (25% of our force) and we couldn't theirs. We were going to close this window at the cost of **increasing the instability, the likelihood that either they or we would preempt!** And his mere plans to do this already increased the likelihood of Andropov preemption!

Did anyone comment on this at the time, the nature of the "window" of vulnerability? The supposed vulnerability wasn't going to go away; what was to be closed was the SU supposedly exclusive capability for D-L by CF against ICBMs.

If a D-L measure (damage-limiting)—specifically, CF (or for that matter, ABM or CD)—results in increasing the opponent's offensive forces, to overwhelm the D-L,

then the prospect of this measure actually limiting damage (compared to what it would have been if the measure had not been undertaken) is a delusion.

Compare this to an agreement that results in smaller offensive forces on both sides. (Once arms control talks started, **there was no excuse or even slight valid rationale for not going down directly to radically lower numbers**, to correct the vastly excessive levels reached in the delusional pursuit of "superiority" and D-L, the delusion of preemption! Possible right after SALT I/ABM (or even earlier, if not Czechoslovakia, Glassboro) (recognizing that pursuit of D-L by ABM is delusional; well, that's equally true of CF, the basis of large forces after 1964, especially MIRV on both sides.) (See the 500,000 troops in Vietnam).

This does limit the prospect of damage in a war: but at the cost of lowering credibility of a (mad or delusional) FS threat (against vulnerable enemy forces on the ground). Hawks will say, this increases the chance of war. Although by the same token, the FS threats may induce one's own confidence to the point of reckless, provocative actions (which are expected to succeed by virtue of the fear evoked by the FS/FU threats).

Opposing kinds of "moral hazard." (from reducing the costs of a war, as by bail-out or forcing seat-belts; or by increasing the likelihood that threats will succeed (by increasing the costs of a war to the opponent, or other means).

R: 1.6 trillion dollar five-year program (to fight protracted nuclear war. Didn't this come in under Carter, protracted war? And then, prevailing. (Protracted war is not unlikely: what is impossible is controlled, survived, won, prevailing protracted war).

Invasion of Afghanistan (!) is taken as a failure of "détente," a betrayal of the spirit. (Wanted and provoked by Brz/Carter!) (WOW! When real challenge was the "loss of Iran," unrelated to SU!) Then, helplessness in Iran hostage crisis 1980 (which Carter overplayed himself, to excuse not fighting Ted Kennedy in primaries).

Did Brezhnev see Carter provocation in Afghanistan as a "betrayal" of détente?! Or was it expected?

Détente and arms control based on assumption that nuc war means mutual suicide. [TRUE!] That period (years? 1967 NPT? Nixon 8 years, Carter's first? 1967-78?) most Americans "found it relatively easy to avoid thinking about nuclear annihilation." (not really since 1963)

[A nuclear attack on SVN by Nixon in fall 1969 would have been the most favorable time in the whole CW to turn against nuclear weapons and threats, for the US and the whole world....]

[Reality: leaders are willing to make

of nuclear suicide, and even to increase the risk, over 0, that they will be carried out. And the public is aware of some of these, in some circumstances, and tolerates them or even rewards rhetoric along these lines, especially since 1990.]

The CPD gang always hated arms control! (under excuse that agreements with the SU were delusional). Really because it worked against making nuclear threats; or, thus, confronting the Russians aggressively ; or preparing for nuclear war, profitably; or because it was popular with the public, working for their rivals.

They reject “peaceful coexistence” with the SU as it is now constituted. (Opposing the SU empire, condemning it, working against it non-violently could be more than reasonable: but risking war with it... They also claimed (pretended? R sincere) to see SU behind all “trouble” in the world. (False)

“Convinced that the nuclear arms race is dangerous not in itself but only if the Soviets gain “superiority,” [NOTE: the opposite of me: **I believe it is dangerous in itself, and that meaningful superiority is impossible for either side.**]

5.

Carlucci called for a “nuclear-war-fighting capability” , a Position that presupposes that nuclear war [between SU and US] can be kept limited, survivable and winnable.”

[compare this to the—unfortunately similar—proposals of mine: kept limited, survivable (not winnable: but “endable” (on “acceptable” terms). Infeasible on all three counts. **Not achievable** if you allow—as I did—for a nuclear response to nuclear attack, OR FU/FS (including preemption: which I allowed for) against SU.

But I was thinking ONLY of second-strike. (My plan was, however, used as a better first-strike plan than its alternative, SIOP-62: EXCEPT for withholding decap, which the military would never prefer to decap, despite the virtually certain suicidal nature of decap in the nuclear era (when decap first became feasible—long dreamed of by the military—and at the same time, suicidal in view of lack of control by either side of surviving forces).

Still: What do you threaten, if you threaten at all? (Moral: you shouldn't be threatening at all; you should try to achieve a world in which it is truly “unthinkable,” to do that! Which we don't have now, alas: so we will probably die from it.

Hyp: . The Soviets did think about, even plan for, the possibility of keeping a nuclear war limited to Europe (see SS-20; and their tac nucs)—just as Reagan hinted, to consternation of Europeans. P. 6 [Yet that would have involved hitting a lot of US bases! Was it really possible? P-II, of course, indicated the reverse on the US side: that a ground attack into West Europe would lead to use of P-II against Moscow.

11. McN in public (with my help!) did endorse the NATO FU policy, though he didn't believe in it.

CPD thesis: Russians believe protracted nuclear war is winnable; and to deter them, you have to have the same capabilities (that convince the Russians that it is survivable and winnable). To deter, aha! Type II deterrence! To confront them outside the US, to dare them to initiate (limited) nuclear war, OR to challenge us to do it (in the belief we would never do a FS, because we didn't believe we could survive it). (or that we would risk their doing it: although their case for surviving a SU FS is not strong, even with CD—unless we induced them to strike in limited fashion, avoiding cities (as I! and McNamara suggested might be possible, in their first strike—ha—or in their second strike, or third...not to start a city exchange...(ha)

(I suppose some people did think we thought that was possible...And I was prepared (aargh) to suggest to K that we might think that...)

Colin Gray was suggesting that with CF, ABM, CD, we hold US casualties down to what the Soviets suffered in WWII, 20 million. (If they could do it, so could we!)

29. Scheer raised "conventional" that eventually each side would have enough weapons to wipe the other out, and that anything over that was just "overkill." But AJW had pointed out that the ability to wipe the other out in a first strike (but not in a second strike) was not a condition or requirement or sufficient for deterrence—but potentially an "invitation," provocation, to be struck preemptively.

AJW wanted not "enough" weapons to survive a first strike but the right posture, hardening, mobility, etc. that would give one the ability to wipe out the other after suffering a first strike.

So why have the "other" weapons that will not survive or are not needed to threaten annihilation after an enemy first strike? Well, for limiting damage—in a second strike? OK, but even then it's a matter of their basing, vulnerability, speed, etc. (not numbers): why so many? It's really for Type II deterrence: damage-limiting in a first strike by offensive operations, depending on how many **vulnerable** (first-strike only) weapons the enemy has. In a dynamic arms race, the more of these FS weapons you have, the more you'll need, if the enemy builds up his vulnerable FS weapons in imitation of you (not a rational response: but the one both sides make!).

But what if both have enough weapons invulnerable to attack by the other to assure annihilation in a second strike? Aren't any other weapons, then, superfluous? In terms of the course of a war, and its outcome, yes (although "there's annihilation and annihilATION" even in a second strike). But you can still PRETEND to believe that this isn't the case, for yourself, or to PRETEND to believe that the enemy doesn't believe that (so may strike first): so you can buy weapons to enable you to continue to threaten FS and to prevent the other from making credible threats. You can't have too many of these: the more irrational the wastage (on weapons that will do nothing other than to "make the rubble bounce"), the more likely you are to look

nutty enough to believe that you'll survive, and to believe that your enemy used to think he would, too, but now he can't.

And it turns out you really can do this. By buying weapons (that Carter had started and programmed, but hadn't started as quickly as R would have or on the scale that R did, and with statements about their effects that Carter wouldn't have made) R DID scare Andropov—into considering an equally irrational preventive strike, as if what Reagan had been saying was valid, for the Soviets!

The R officials backed off after Scheer's articles and said they were just trying to disabuse the Soviets of believing they could survive and win (not threatening them with a FS)—but on the contrary a) they were asserting that what they attributed to the Soviets was a valid view, and b) what they were buying (on Carter's programs!) was suited to a FS. How was the MX in fixed silos going to convince the Soviets they couldn't win a FS nuclear war? Or US CD?

R thought the Russians were preparing for a "preemptive" war. And he was right! What else? And Andropov (feeling the US was preparing for a preventive war—which was plausible, but wrong) WAS preparing for a preemptive war (on strategic intelligence warning—which is similar to a preventive war, although distinguishable! Non-"crisis" circumstances! Not unlike von Moltke, expecting an inevitable German vs. Slav war and not wanting to wait until 1917 for it...)

"Emulating" an enemy's "FS/preemptive" capabilities is hardly the way to counter them or to deter their FS: it makes it more likely. (Were they really proposing that surviving MX after an SU FS were needed and worthwhile to hit hard targets in the SU, i.e. ICBMs that hadn't been fired in the first salvo, and C3—crippling the latter in the second- and later rounds?)

"Surviving" was to depend on CD, plus CF and ABM. But "prevailing/winning" was to depend on (an \$18 billion program for) survivable C3.

Vance called these plans "madness," and so they are. But are the people mad, or just lying about their believe is feasible and what they could do with it, in order to scare the Soviets. (US C3 can't be protected from SU attack even in a US FS, beyond the first attack.)(**Contrary to my BNSP, too.**⁹

["If they think they can "win" (as the Soviets said in manuals) "we've got to convince them that they can't win." By acting as if we believed we could win—by doing the same things they're doing? By pretending that we believe we can have survivable C3? But that only tells them that we may think WE can win: to which the only answer might be SU FS! (But that's suicide! Yes, but—as Pipes etc. said—Andropov didn't seem to think so! The answer may be: Andropov didn't think the Soviets could survive well enough to make a FS worthwhile if the US wasn't ever expected to strike first itself: but to make it survivable enough to make it worthwhile to head off a US strike preventively: a "tragic but distinguishable state." Not an aggressive,

expansionist state of mind, aimed at world domination by military means—the destruction of the SU would not be sufficiently compensated even by subsequent world domination—but a defensive, panicked, desperate state that even annihilation-1 was less awful than annihilation-2 (US FS_. **So their view that the SU could in some circumstances consider and even carry out a first strike was valid, true** (it wouldn't have been particularly dangerous, only wasteful, and possibly productive of US aggressions that were dangerous (though Reagan didn't actually do this!—if this hadn't been true)—and they were doing just what (could be foreseen to be) what was necessary to bring about those circumstances and that Soviet state of mind!

Actually, the Soviets (driven by their labs and MIC?) were doing much the same as the Reaganauts, probably partly for the same reasons: Type I, maybe Type II deterrence, keep the US from pushing and their own leadership from giving in (as K had to do in Berlin and Cuba!)

Colin Gray and CPD views on the “escalation ladder” (and Nitze's) seem entirely in line with Herman Kahn's twenty years earlier! (Was Gray from Hudson Institute, by any chance? Keith Payne?) (And fundamentally, that was NATO/US/SAC policy, unknown to HK! Throughout the CW!

CPD starts in November, 1976 (election of Carter!) (reaction to HAK/N and Ford/Schles/Rumsfeld then: wait, Team B under Bush!, not yet Carter!; so it's opposition to Ford's CIA!/: opposition to SALT II): same year as I walk in to DC with the Continental Walk for Peace and Social Justice! Mobilization for Survival?!

CPD: “the view “that the SU is as unrelentingly aggressive as Nazi Germany was in the thirties—except that the Soviets now have nuclear weapons and are willing to use them.”

[But US/NATO also has nuclear weapons, unlike at Munich! Well...]

If the Soviets really believed—at the current stage of the nuclear era!—that they could fight and win a protracted nuclear war (as the CPD believed they did)—a) they were mad, they were totally wrong, and they would be just as wrong if the US cut its weapons in half (or much less) and the SU doubled theirs! B) there would be no hope of disabusing them by our buying more weapons; c) least of all by emulating their own “FS” (or D-L) programs, which would indeed not increase their hope of “winning” but WOULD increase their incentive to preempt (foolishly, unrealistically, irrationally, but humanly/institutionally “natural” like us!) to reduce the disastrousness of loss/stalemate/chaos).

But SU hawks/armers did support US hawks/armers synergistically, and vice versa (as I said to Primakov and Sergei Plekhanov in 1982!) As did invasion of Afghanistan (falling into the Brz.Carter trap), their own statements in manuals (like

ours) (think of comparing the Koran with the Bible), their own suppression of their own people and satellites. But none of this “justified” our programs.

Shultz was a founding member of CPD. ! (anti-HAK!)

Was the K strategic program of almost pure bluff “inadequate” in the Fifties and Sixties ? It encouraged a US buildup, from superiority to huge superiority: but did that actually make any difference, was it critical in Berlin or Cuba?

Hyp; NO. (Granted, if the balance had been just as slanted in the other direction, that would have made a difference. But how could that have come about, with our MIC and USAF, and Ike? But after 1964, it could never be that slanted again, neither side could have had that kind of “superiority.”)

Would things have been different if K had had the kinds of forces, backing up his boasts (not bluffs), that our 1958 NIE predicted? Not, overall superiority (except in ICBMs), but solid retaliatory forces. Thus, was it really urgent, or worthwhile, for Brezhnev to build up to what, say, McNamara expected, even?

Hyp: No. He had to back down in Berlin because we were “crazy,” prepared to make what sounded like fully committing statements that we were prepared to...commit suicide (especially for Europe) over Berlin. It was plausible (even if untrue for JFK and McNamara). (Perhaps true for Ike! Who didn't face ANY SU ICBMs in 1958-59).

In Cuba, he claimed the same, and even prepared for it. But (like JFK) he wasn't prepared to go to nuclear war (not 1/3, not 1/2, not any) really. And that was NOT because we had 10 to one superiority in ICBMs. **Like JFK, he would have felt the same (not being insane) if he had had 10 to 1 superiority, as JFK did.** He wasn't significantly more reckless, less cautious, than JFK (though he blustered as if he was—partly because, knowing himself to be weaker, he felt he had to pretend, keep secrecy, lie.)

Neither were insane; they just were prepared, like their predecessors and successors, to pretend they were insane (and, with “normal statesman's insanity,” risk disaster—even, as Einstein indicated, unprecedented, humanly unimaginable disaster-- for big diplomatic stakes, as in WWI. (Neither were like Hitler; but it didn't take that to bring on WWI; and if nuclear weapons had existed then, the experience of the last seventy years tells me...we wouldn't be here.)

In brinkmanship, in CW diplomacy and bargaining, it helps, in fact it's been believed to be indispensable, to appear to have “depraved indifference” to mass murder, to be capable of “depraved heart murder.” And it's easy to appear that way; it's essentially true.

Neither Ike nor JFK stood firm on Berlin because they foolishly believed that Europe (or even the US) would survive a nuclear war with the much smaller Soviet forces.

They both knew the opposite. Larger Soviet forces would not, I believe, have made any difference in their official, public stands (or even their classified plans! Facing the JCS).

Nor were either of them, I believe, insane in the degree of being willing to accept a certainty **or a high risk** of nuclear war. ✓

They both simply **pretended** to be that insane, bluffing, backing it up with heavy expenditures, deployments, rhetoric (at the price of scaring their own people, as well as each other). K's bluffing was cheaper, hollow (made possible by extreme secrecy within the SU, almost pure bluffs. But that's not why he had to back down, even when exposed. (It would have been different if he had had literally nothing, if the US had a total monopoly of nuclear weapons, though facing his truly superior conventional forces. His actual minimal deterrent was enough.) But JFK out-bluffed him in acting insane. ✓

Though neither was as insane as they pretended, they were insane in a more historically and species'-oriented sense: they **were** willing to take the **small** risks of ultimate catastrophe (less small than they thought, but still small) raised by the game of brinksmanship they were playing, the pretenses they were sustaining. After the firebombing of WWII (depraved heart mass murder—though deceptive, in terms of scale and irreversibility, as a preparation for nuclear planning and threats) their publics were ready not to recognize what they were doing as insane. (Reagan was a little **too** convincing in his pretenses, for either the American public or the Soviet leadership. Also, his people were more explicit to the public about their underlying supposed "logic.")

They were successful (K had to back down) because they effectively, plausibly, conveyed the pretense that they **might** be just that insane: that they would, rather than give up Berlin, accept a high risk or even certainty of catastrophic nuclear war (perhaps in insanely foolish belief that they could survive it, however badly). "Might be" in the sense that the probability that they were that insane, though perhaps low in K's mind, was still not low enough for him to take the gamble. (Could JFK really believe, K had to figure, that the civil defense program he encouraged in July 1961 would be adequate against the Soviet forces JFK presumably imagined up until then?)

In Berlin, I think, both sides (and US allies) were planning **to surrender preemptively when necessary**. But JFK hid that effectively. And K didn't care THAT much (especially after the Wall) to test his pretense by starting hostile operations, blocking access.

Likewise in Cuba: both intended, I believe, to surrender (accept the other's terms) "preemptively," rather than initiate armed conflict. But then K found that Castro

might pull the rug out, might initiate armed conflict (as he seemed already to have done, already influencing a SAM commander to fire at an American plane (as Turks just fired at a Russian plane, over fifty years later: the only NATO/Russian casualties in armed conflict in that whole period!) so that K, if he delayed “surrendering,” might not have time to do so before two-sided armed conflict was underway. He wouldn’t have time to preempt conflict (a US attack on SAMs or missiles or invasion), not enough warning that it was imminent.

If he’d had hundreds of ICBMs, he wouldn’t have needed to send MRBMs to Cuba at all: but he could have, just as he could have in 1962 and gotten away with it if he’d played it right! But if he was going to send tac nucs (which did make sense to prevent an invasion of Cuba) but not reveal them, then he would have been under just as much pressure to withdraw on Oct. 28 as he was, with Castro out of control!

So to avoid either a Cuba or a Berlin, it wouldn’t have done the Soviets any good, relatively to what happened, to have had parity with the US, or even moderate “superiority” (which JFK thought they did have, in Berlin 1961). That means they didn’t “have” to—to “avoid such defeats” (which could have been avoided in the case of Cuba) build up either to “parity” or to any kind of supposed “superiority.” US “superiority” had not been critical in either case, and imitating it would not have changed the outcome for the Soviets.

Moral: The SU would have been just as safe—in fact, **safer**—and saved a vast amount of resources if they had either a) not built up at all, (if that: even better, go for agreements that cut down US programs and didn’t build up Soviets’) (avoid MIRV, avoid hundreds of missiles on either side, stop accuracy testing, CTB...); or b) not go beyond K’s program for SS-7s and some SLBMs: a CHINESE PROGRAM. They really had no more need for strategic nuclear programs than the Chinese did! Or French or British! (enough to deter US tac nucs)

Except/unless: they needed a US threat to justify the presence of Soviet units in East Europe (the way we needed a Soviet threat to justify the US nuclear and troop role in West Europe!) The Chinese didn’t have a comparable issue. (They got enough nucs to deter a US attack on them for supporting NVN).

The Chinese would have been LESS SAFE if they had built 200-300 ICBMs, enough to make it look that they might be tempted to preempt on warning, and might expect a US attack.

The Brezhnev buildup made the SU less safe than it was at the start. It led to a huge buildup in US FS forces, and incentives on both sides to preempt, almost realized (by the SU!) in 1983! It certainly did them no good to appear to “surpass” the US in any element of the strategic forces, to aim at or achieve “superiority.” (We were no more going to allow that than Britain was going to allow Germany to win the “battleship race” before WWI. The larger force of ICBMs is about as beneficial to the Russians as their battleships were to Germany.

We hadn't continued to build up as much in the Seventies because after the bloated increases of the Sixties there was obviously no point in it, even for pretense. But that was vulnerable politically to be attacked by the CPD as "unilaterally disarming" while the Soviets "continued racing ahead," as if the "superiority" of the Sixties had been essential or even in any way worthwhile to us, as if it was again achievable by either side, and as if the Soviets could use their "superiority" against us as in Cuba or Berlin (two great superpower backdowns, indeed! Any comparable ones? Until Iraq, or VN...or Afghanistan. Korea: when we had a near-monopoly! And, of course, the "loss of China." Or the loss of Iran, as elites saw it, who knew that Iran was secretly, covertly "ours" (as we had assumed we had a right to regard China in 1948).

Yes, it got them, for a while, "equal status" in arms control negotiations (what else?) which were needed to compensate for the increased dangers of the buildup, and failed to do so.

Trump and Cruz appear to be at least as crazy as the neo-cons.

Sunday, January 24, 2016

8:19 AM

[Other bizarre, grotesquely unjust/inhumane social customs (aside from preparing for and threatening two-sided nuclear war):

Aztec sacrifice

Chattel slavery

Genital mutilation (female "circumcision"; (male?)

(war?)

We've been preparing to defend against a Hitler (Napoleon) armed with nuclear weapons for seventy years. And pretending recurrently that we faced one.

There hasn't been one. (Stalin: not. His successors: not. Mao: not. (though Stalin and Mao were comparably ruthless and tyrannical.) No NWS has (yet) had such a barbarous pirate as a leader.

(If Churchill had had nuclear weapons earlier; or FDR; well, we say what hst did...; but neither acted on their fantasies of nuclear ultimatums after the war...)

But that's still possible. ISIS having purchased a half dozen nuclear weapons (could they leverage that to get more? Half the Pakistani arsenal? What is the relation of

ISIS to Pakistan? (I should know; but I don't recall (sic) reading about it. (interesting question, it turns out: mixed picture, neither entirely reassuring nor unreassuring: see Pakistan under ISIS in Nuc Refs).

Chap. 7, Scheer: (earlier chapters in notebook, last night);

May 9, 1982: in response to public pressure from the Freeze, R announces a START proposal (emphasis on R, Reduction, vs. Freeze): one-sided, sure to be rejected but perhaps a starting point (Carter): calls for cuts in SU ICBMs, little from US triad. 5000 ceiling on BM warheads, half from ICBMs ("most destabilizing"). Cut total number of BMs to half the current US number, equal numbers. (ha) Mutual ceiling on throwweight, to below current US number. Equalize numbers down to below US levels, but mostly by cutting SU ICBMs. (Note: what SU had NOT built up or matched US in was SLBMs, only survivable part: yes, that was destabilizing IF it made any sense under any circumstances—tactical warning—for a preemptive FS for either side (i.e., if it could withstand enemy capability for total devastation of its society; or, CPD claimed, WWII levels, 20 M dead).

Molander: called on SU to restructure their SRF along US lines. (More stable: EXCEPT for large remaining ICBM forces, FS.) (If done, the threat to MMs would not be decreased!) Omits bomber forces (3000 US warheads to 300) and CMs.

SU: lack of "equity" (US bomber warheads), major restructuring (unlike earlier negots)...(On both sides, bullshit considerations, in face of grotesque situation...) Bigger cuts by SU; SU accuses R of still seeking military superiority (issue: meaning of superiority). P. 168n

Muskie: "a secret agenda for sidetracking *disarmament* while the US gets on with *rearmament*." (as in past!) "rear (rearmament)?"

ACDA had now been stacked with opponents of arms control. (Rostow, Rowney, later Adelman) (CF stacking, say, EPA with opponents of regulation: also done?)

[Rostow attitude: (Where was Walt on all these issues? Never mentioned! In fact, I don't know of any position of his on nuclear weapons!): Danger is appeasement (not arms race, stable or unstable) (Perle, too): Purpose of armament is **to affect the outcome of a game of chicken: to confront opponent with—and not to be confronted with—a more credible threat of mutual homicide/suicide/omnicide**, in recurrent non-nuclear conflict situations. Big danger: alliances breaking up (US being excluded from Europe, or Asia (by Japan/Chinese dealings), loss of US hegemony: if allies see US confronting "superior" SU nuclear forces, or US loses its "superiority."89

(Assumption is that there really is minimal risk in unstable nuclear forces, neither side wants to or really will go first, even preemptively: all the danger is in the effect of "appearances" of asymmetry on US allies and the president himself. But, 1983.

And it really was not true (we now know) that Reagan had any desire or thoughts of striking first in a crisis. (Not clear to Andropov; or us!) If we had known that, (and Andropov!), would the issue simply been one of wasteful expenditure? (If we had been sure that no successor would be more prone to possible preemption than R?)

[Note: all this follows a secret nuclear crisis in 1980 between Carter and SU on Iran! Possibly none of these actually knew that! Very relevant to their concerns. Or maybe they presumed that contingency.] (See Carter doctrine! For M.E. Nitze on SU capability to project their conventional forces, with local superiority! Nitze had always been concerned about this, as a reason for the US not to adopt NFU!)

See Nitze 90. He ascribes to the SU a view that if they can fight and win a nuclear war (their aim, in building up), with "superiority" over US, then (implicitly in his argument) they can deter the US from carrying out its FU threats, if the US is losing a non-nuclear conflict outside NATO, i.e., defang the US FU policy (which in turn compensates for US conventional inferiority on the periphery of the SU. All this is in the context of the "loss of Iran" and SU presence in Afghanistan ("threat to the Persian Gulf...")...Nitze's argument against Kennan's proposal of NFU.

SU as having "started the new arms race," by building up during the Seventies (beyond "what was needed for defense" in CPD eyes—i.e., along US lines! Doing what we did, not what we said (MAD). Culminating in expansion into Afghanistan! (see Crimea, today).

See my presentation to the Econometric Society: Winning at Russian Roulette. Nitze's goal: winning (not-losing) at Nuclear Chicken.

NSC-68, 1950 (max danger, 1954); Gaither Report, 1957 (max danger, 1959); CPD 1976-82, max danger 1985-). (three big buildups based on these warnings).

Second one, after Cuba and Berlin (not first one, except for a hollow bluff policy on K part), a self-fulfilling prophecy for SU buildup.

93. When Carter attempted to placate Nitze in his opposition to SALT-II (US "edge" was being given up) by endorsing the \$40-60 billion MX, Nitze still opposed SALT-II. (not trusting Carter?). Lock in US to inferiority, while SU continues its march toward world domination, "forced accommodation" with SU, "world retreat" by US.

There was hope that Haig (!) (like HAK!) would still support SALT-II under Reagan, with Burt (!) as Asst. sEc State (with friend Perle in DOD): but Burt's influence lowered when Haig left, and friendship soured. (Burt opposed SALT-II anyway).. He opposed sitting down the the SU, it legitimized them; arms control recognized them as co-equal. (K goal, in Berlin and Cuba!). Vs. N-Brezhnev summit, champagne. Burt had been sympathetic NYT reporter on Nitze during Carter. (Studied under Scott Thompson, Nitze's son-in-law. (gay!) Vs. "**doctrine of MAD**" (which described a fact that *our actual plans and deployments "denied,"* failed to recognize or

reflect, so as not to acknowledge that our threats were threats of mutual suicide/omnicide, lowering their credibility.

"We and SU /Russia have been and are still in denial of the reality of MAD (AD of all civilization), in 1980's and now again." Fully comparable to denial of man-made climate change, or of "old earth" or evolution.

[But note: Reagan and his advocates claimed after 1989-91 that their programs and their doctrines had led to the implosion of the USSR, and that this had been their real purpose all along. (Putting aside whether Gorbachev would not have done what he did without any of this US buildup or rhetoric or SDI—which I believe—consider possibility that R did have this in mind, even primarily: a hyp that we would not have addressed earlier, and if we had, would have seemed to us (wrongly) manifestly infeasible. (It doesn't seem to fit for CPD/Nitze/Rostow/Pipes at all: and CPD did fill the ranks for Reagan.)

But for Reagan himself? He did seem to foresee and aim at the downfall of the SU (not unlike, in a different way, EPT and END! Opposite approach, influencing Gorbachev with NOD). That would mean we totally misread the purpose (and potential positive effect) of Reagan's buildup and his rhetoric!

Nevertheless, his approach (vs. that of Gorbachev and European peace groups) raised the danger of SU preemptive attack, just as we warned! Humanity lucked out; Reagan won his gamble, as, one might say in retrospect, was likely: but far from certain, with the world at stake.

(Consider: I was an AJW protégé, and a "Henry Jackson Democrat." Perle was a protégé of AJW (like Wolfowitz) who went to work for Jackson (then a consulting firm with Lehman, SecNav, CPD. Then ASD for ISA! (my old office; I wouldn't have been his special assistant, I would have had his job or a higher one: if I had wanted it and been capable of it, neither the case.)

cf "sacrifices" for defense (budge) with acceptance of the risks of nuclear war.

RS assumption that R agreed with CPD thinking (as he seemed to do, in his statements: but just possibly NOT, as shown in Reykjavik! What was THEIR reaction to "the Day After"?)

Brezhnev call for NFU in June 1982, a few days before R June 17 speech (Central Park rally? Two months earlier (April? Spring 1982 FA) the gang of 4 call for NFU (preempted by Haig rejection): McN, Smith, Bundy, Kennan)

[Initiating nuclear attacks against a NWS (SU, US) (in 80's) would have risks (high probability of escalation) or results (of FS) worse than that of any other humanly-caused event in the world, EXCEPT (possibly, plausibly) being the subject of a FS. Is

even the latter an exception, or not? It is plausibly believed by both sides to be one: and that is in the interest of maintaining a capability for CF preemption and a warning system (i.e. maintaining that it is an exception, promoting that belief, is in the interests of all those who want to build, buy, deploy—or threaten—arms for that alleged purpose.

Another supposed (but not real, even plausible) exception: to “win” a conflict that has already escalated to limited nuclear exchanges that threaten to devastate a major area, Europe, without becoming all-out exchanges against the superpower homelands. I.e., “we” definitely wanted to threaten to escalate to a FS in that case; and for credibility of the threat, we would like to pretend, at least, to believe that the results of our FS, while worse than anything else that might occur (except being struck), would still be better than, say, seeing Europe devastated. (The problem here being that Europe would CERTAINLY be devastated as a result of our FS and the SU short-range retaliation against it. But we have successfully presented ourselves as being in denial about that for seventy years).

No, that contingency could not make it “rational” (preferable) to escalate to FS (from a nuclear conflict limited to Europe), WITHOUT the (plausible) expectation that such a conflict was likely to escalate to a SU FS (rational or not for the SU): hence that our escalation to a FS would be preemptive.

We come back: Can preemption actually BE “rational,” for either side, in any circumstances whatever? I conclude: NOT. Unfortunately, arms-makers, Air Forces/SRF, promoters of FS threats, can make it appear rational, or persuade leaders and Congress that it is worthwhile to act as if it were rational or at least predictable (by one side or the other) to Strike First Rather Than Second. (SFRTF (not LSMFT). Hence the real danger (however small, but non-zero) of omnicide persists.

Is it worth attacking that presumption, slogan, in detail? I’m assuming yes—and the case can be made quite convincing (that any possible difference is out-of-comparison-small compared to the difference between FS and no nuclear war, if nuclear war can be avoided). (that holds true even if “nuclear war” is reduced—say, by arms reductions—to five to ten nuclear weapons exploding on cities). Whether the argument, even widely accepted, actually results in major reductions (e.g., below the possibility of nuclear winter) is another matter. I.e., or any argument.

The Gang of Four conceded the FU policy might have made some sense in the Fifties (when the US had a vast edge over a feeble SU nuclear force: vs. US, not Europe!): i.e., **it gave the US hegemony in West Europe and Asia!** See its effects on alliances! (ours, and blocking East-West alliances in Europe and Asia) (and gave great profits—I’ve never seen an estimate of these, or what the alternatives were for our MIC!—to the MICs).

They claimed it no longer “made sense” in an age of parity. (BUT it hadn’t lost its real advantages, its possible “successes” in crises, in Chicken competitions, “competitions in risk-taking” (TCS)—even though it no longer rested on threats of actions that were remotely “rational” compared to crisis alternatives. Suicide bombing. Kamikaze threats. Terrorist threats involving mass death of the perpetrators. Samson Option. (Israel, France, south Africa: by US and SU! Holocaust as threat: **mutual holocaust**. We had a Holocaust strategy in Germany and Japan! (But “only” with firebombing, not nuclear; and no possibility of retaliation, no effects outside enemy borders; quick recovery.) (And, as Rostow noted even for TN war (wrongly): “not the whole population.”)

(McNamara did hold the line on expanding Minuteman and buying B-70—as he did hold the line against expanding bombing against NVN in 1966-68—and by the same method: claiming additional expenditure wouldn’t be worth it, wouldn’t have comparable benefit to preceding investment, but without condemning or trying to reverse the previous escalation/investment, leaving it “at work” (killing and dying, in VN—encouraging escalation when he had departed (which didn’t happen, thanks to Tet, but did keep war going for 7 years)—and maintaining unstable system encouraging continued nuclear threats and possible preemption, ever since.

(This despite the reality of MAD, recognized in 1963 by NESC and JFK, ever since; and immovable stalemate (escalating) in VN, recognized by McNamara in fall 1965.)

McNamara told LBJ of stalemate (as probable in fall 1965, clear in 1966) but never publicly in office. He announced MAD as a reason for not buying as many **more** weapons as the USAF wanted but still kept “triad” and went for MIRV (and even ABM) (though the logic of MAD implied that a small fraction of current forces were the most necessary, and that the additional ones we maintained—especially the ICBMs-- were a dangerous, illusionary temptation to both side sides to preempt given “warning”, possibly false, and irrelevant to the potential outcome even if it were true.) I

n both cases, he was concealing from Congress, allies and public (though not the president) and lying about his real appreciation of the realities, his real reasons for the policies he promoted and those he rejected. He was supposedly presenting rational argument for his policies, which he knew to be invalid and which were not his real reasons. Standard behavior for politicians and bureaucrats. But in opposing strong domestic opponents, he was supposedly “educating” the public about realities and alternatives: while actually deceiving them. He actually did have a good grasp of the realities and of public ignorance and the fallacies of his opponents, but he eschewed real education of the public, real “candor.” (As all NWS have done, for 70 years).

In both cases he avoided a major fight with Congress and MIC (and allies: possible reduction in hegemony in Europe and Asia): at cost of persistence of a costly,

unjustified and dangerous status quo process, with recurrent danger of policies getting even more dangerous.

[Problem: It is plausible that if you spend enough money on “war-fighting” you can come out of a nuclear war better than if you were struck first. Just as it is plausible that the US of A should be able to defeat the NLF, if it went in big enough. (or ISIS). But mistaken. A hard case to make, in abstraction. (except with the experience of VN; and now Iraq, Afghanistan...).

It's less hard to make the case that it's not worth the vast money to be spent on war-fighting, another trillion dollars: yet, who is making it? Who cares enough? (“We’re paying it to ourselves,” like the national debt? “ourselves”?) But it can blow up. (One could say: Well, so it could after your—Ellsberg’s—proposals were followed, to a practically realistic degree (not much, half, two-thirds...) To much the same effect! (true: though arguably, much less likely: UNLESS, the critics would say, my approach led to more reckless behavior by either side, and resulting armed conflict...my approach needs to be accompanied by diplomatic and world-order changes to make that less likely: very feasible, except for MIC and imperial opposition...)

Q to RS: What was the experience with the Communists in the Screen Actors Guild that so hardened Reagan and Beilenson against these “monsters”? p. 101. (See Teller’s mother in Hungary—or grandmother/--vs. Bela Kun).

Those who wanted to sell weapons had a strong interest in claiming (and pretending, at least, to believe) that the Soviets (a) believed they could launch a first strike, and survive (or would be able to, when their CF forces were fully deployed, in about 1985), and (b) that they were right, unless the US built up its forces greatly in like fashion [there was a logical/hypocritical hole here, because the SU could not be disabused of that notion by the US building vulnerable FS weapons like the fixed-silo MX, and a SU FS/CD program (based on evacuation) wouldn’t be affected by a US comparable program, which Reagan proposed.

The real goal was for the US to acquire the threatening advantages of a FS capability itself, so the US could achieve the benefits that these people claimed the SU sought and either already had or were on the verge of having, without a US buildup. This would inevitably be at the price of accepting greater instability, lowering US deterrence of a SU preemptive strike.

So the proponents of SU CD as permitting a disarming FS didn’t necessarily believe in either proposition above, it just suited them to claim it, to pretend they believed that the SU believed it and that they believed the SU were right to believe it. They may have “believed” in some sense, without really having thought much about it or confronted their beliefs with much evidence, especially counter-argument. (It was hard for their critics to refute their belief that the Soviets believed it, which was enough to buttress their argument for a buildup “to match the Soviets.”)

Did Nitze really believe this shit? Hard to believe. But T.K. Jones, an engineer from Boeing, probably did. And Pipes seemed to. And people like this were given important jobs. On the other hand, it would have been hard to predict, from Scheer's book in 1982 or 1983, the turnaround Reagan would make in 1986, October 11-12. (Relation in time to Iran-Contra?) or the INF Treaty. Certainly the main interest Perle had in the buildup was assuring that SU "superiority"—supposedly, but very dubiously, related to ability to survive a large nuclear war—would not erode our alliance relationships or the president's willingness to confront the Soviets, say in the Middle East. US "superiority" was easy to sell, though harder (encouraging crazy HK judgments about surviving nuclear war, with CD and ABM) than selling the need to prevent any impression or appearance, by the SU or our allies, of SU "superiority." (Which they were brazenly claiming was about to arrive, or had already done so, and was the aim of the Soviets (who may indeed have been feeling their oats about influence in the Horn of Africa or elsewhere, having broken out of "inferiority" which they felt had disadvantaged them in Cuba and Berlin: here they agreed with the CPD, rightly or, as I think, wrongly).

The "doves" like McNamara or Warnke, had never taken the trouble, or risk, to explain or claim that there was no such thing as meaningful superiority—with or without CD or ABM or MX or SS-18—because it would raise questions why they weren't pressing to rid ourselves unilaterally of the superfluous weapons we ourselves were maintaining. (Bargaining chips? But we didn't even offer or propose, e.g. big cuts or elimination of our ICBMs, or bombers. Or D-5 warheads.) So if the Soviets appeared "superior" in similar weapons (which we had defined as useless)...

Reagan really didn't intend to strike first, at all. NOR, I suspect, ever to initiate first-use, or LSR. (limited strategic retaliation/reprisal). Or even, really, to threaten these, in crises (as probably Perle and others did. Perle, e.g. thought we had buckled to SU pressure to rein in the Israelis in 1973 because we had "lost our strategic edge": ? my first reaction, that's almost surely wrong. Worth analyzing, since he did.)

[RS doesn't seem to know about the preparations for nuclear war involving COG, Rumsfeld and Cheney and others, exercises (as under Carter): see Vulcans. How does this relate to the question of whether R thought GW really likely or possible? His reaction to The Day After: depressed, but "we've GOT to deter!"

HK did believe that GW was survivable, with proper preparations. And we should risk GW on this basis. (CD)

Probably the basis for all the SU CD concern was their program of deep blast shelters for their command and cadre (which we planned to dig out).

Realities:

--LSR with SU/R can't be limited.

--tac nuc war with Su/R can't be limited.

--strategic war with SU can't be survived, either in FS or retaliation. Prevailing is impossible or meaningless.

--and strategic war can't be limited, controlled (protracted with centralized control).

--any armed conflict with Russian forces has the potential of going nuclear: though this is not certain, depends on location, circumstances. Once nuclear, very unlikely to stay limited (not quite impossible).

--beliefs contradicting the above four points can be alleged, but not very credibly and not without arousing great controversy and refutation. Threats of any of them are possible and may even be effective, but their credibility must rest on other considerations than the plausibility of such beliefs. So far as the enemy is concerned, it must be understood that these are threats of omnicide: which, however, might be carried out.

Possible triggers for GW: 1) tactical warning (false) (1979, 1980, 1995);

2) what seems very strong strategic warning (1983); (

3) ongoing armed conflict between US and Russian troops, with high expectation of going nuclear with tac nucs or strategic nucs (either side might preempt, madly) (came close in 1962; threatened now in Ukraine; possible in Syria);

4) nuclear conflict between others (India-Pak? Others in future) in which both US and SU look likely to get involved.

5) terrorist or catalytic attack, not recognized. (see submarine, 1962

"MAD" very crucially obscures the reality of global hostages—all humanity—to the actions, policies, postures, threats of the two superpowers. The Assured Destruction is NOT only, or even mainly, "Mutual," for these two powers. It is universal in a planetary sense. (Not even confined to neighborhoods or the same hemisphere as the US and SU, not confined to fallout patterns. Though even in 1964 those neighborhoods included all of Eurasia and North America. Now, the southern hemisphere is equally to be denuded of most human life (and other vertebrates). McNamara's original term Assured Destruction—with no explicit limits—was actually more descriptive. Planetary Assured Destruction. Global Assured Destruction: GLAD.

142-44n: After Reagan program, the US would STILL be subject to a Nitze-attack (or, OK, my attack: assuming no decap): the vulnerability of the ICBMs wouldn't have diminished at all (merely the incentive to hit them preemptive, the MX, would have

increased! (This program exposes the “window of vulnerability” argument as a total hoax by the CPD and Reagan, as a supposed feared danger, something that needed “closing,” ending; it was simply a cover for our making the SU hard targets vulnerable, threatening them with indefinitely prolonged vulnerability, like ourselves.

Granted, surviving MX and MM and bombers could hit remaining SU hard targets, if they could identify what remained! So, supposedly, with something to hit, the US WOULD retaliate, under threat: but to what effect? US cities would still be under threat (like SU cities): the idea is that the US would (STILL!) be reluctant to start a city exchange (so what if the president did decide to hit some SU hard targets, not cities: what would they care? Answer: then we would BOTH be denuded of hard-target-kill capability and of hard targets; both would have only city-busting weapons (we would have far more! But they would have enough!) as if neither had any to begin with. Or, without our buildup, they would be left with more hard-target-kill weapons than we had (none): but so what, since they would have destroyed all the hard targets!

It was also a hoax to declare that the Soviets **believed** they could escape from a “mutual” hostage relationship with the US (where the hostages include not only almost the entire SU population but almost the entire world population: as of 1983, or, let’s say, 2007), and that they had to be disabused of this belief (and least honest of all, that the Reagan program would do this!).

On the other hand, 1983 shows that there **was** a potential for SU consideration of a preemptive attack (on either true or false premises) **despite** the mutual hostage situation and that the Reagan “analyses”/warnings and programs were precisely calculated to produce this consideration, and did so! The problem was NOT the future potential credibility of a Soviet threat to escalate to a FS in a confrontation, in the absence of SU fear of a US FU or FS, but the possibility that the Soviets would secretly utilize their built-up D-L forces to preempt feared US escalation, either during a confrontation or even in its absence (fearing a US surprise attack: totally unrealistically, yet plausibly on the basis of Reagan rhetoric and programs).

Improvements in accuracy for both the MM-III, MX and Trident D-5 only increased the capability to eliminate the SU land-based ICBMs in a US FS. That didn’t give us a disarming capability! (Even though 75% of their warheads were on their ICBMs, vs. 20% of ours, for comparable totals). Their “150” warheads at sea were still more than enough to destroy US society in a second strike, just as our 3000 at sea could do. Our “superiority” at sea simply didn’t give us a significant advantage of any sort, any more than their “superiority” in numbers of ICBM warheads did give them. Wiping out the ICBMs on either side would not significantly change the outcome of the war for the attacking party! So why have the capability to do it?

Well (aside from profits to the MIC, etc.) it does support the appearance you might foolishly believe that you could reduce damage to “acceptable” levels, OR that you

could at least reduce it enough to make it worthwhile to preempt on tactical or strategic warning (the latter, perhaps, based on ongoing armed conflict, or tactical nuclear conflict), thus, that you are capable of carrying out your threats of FS if “provoked.” Thus, the threats might be effective. (Or, lead to preemption by the other, as might have happened in 1983!)

Even making the threats and the expensive preparations for FS makes you look so crazy, detached from reality, that you might carry out the threats, crazily (or because you were crazy enough to believe what you were saying and paying for about damage-limiting).

(Such threats—on which NATO was based—can hardly look **as** credible if you DON'T buy these preparations: or at least, they look like nothing but threats of crazy mutual suicide, which is what they are whether you buy the new weapons or not.)

Clearly, the Reagan officials did convince Robert Scheer that they meant what they said, that nuclear war was winnable and survivable, with the CD, ABM and weapons they proposed (and which, they claimed, the Soviets were investing in, in that belief).

Which ones was that really true for? Not Reagan, probably, in retrospect. (Except maybe for SDI—he hoped).

When you sound optimistic, claim optimism for ability to “eliminate the threat of (the enemy's) ballistic missiles,” and are spending huge sums on research and even more on deployment: it is more than plausible that your researchers and officials may come to feel that the effort has been worthwhile and successful, and that they can make threats they are actually prepared to carry out if defied.

A “**self-supporting threat**” (cf. self-fulfilling prophecy—e.g., that an enemy is dangerously preparing an attack). A threat (otherwise scarcely credible) that strengthens its own credibility simply by being made and apparently believed by its maker to be credible and effective (though not certain to succeed), evidenced by both statements and expensive efforts to be ready to act on it if necessary. The latter, to be sure, suggests that the threatener is not sure that his threat will be sufficiently credible without that further effort, but if the effort is expensive, he looks as if he believes that it will be worthwhile (which could only be by its succeeding, at the least by lowering damage significantly: actually, a foolish expectation, but one that officials committing large resources to the effort could normally persuade themselves was valid.)

Thus, the new systems may work (to deter, to threaten) if the officials are convincing that they **believe** they will work (both to lower or eliminate damage, and to deter), however unrealistic that may seem to an observer. Teller and Reagan were good at that. Almost too good—convincing not only Scheer, but Andropov (who, unhappily, may have been convinced by his own generals that it was worth preempting Reagan's surprise attack!)

SDI, however, was probably overwhelmingly welcomed by the MIC (rather than the imperialists or generals): billions in research. (Though blocking a CTB—which the generals are said to have wanted!)

Question: Is it worth launching on warning, if you are sure that an enemy attack is on the way: a) knowing that you may be wrong to be so sure? b) if in fact a large attack is on the way?

Take (b) first. If you believe the Soviets will have 150 or more warheads left after their attack (or, after your reply) then what difference is it going to make to, say, reduce them to that level (by hitting their remaining ICBMs and subs in port and C3)? What difference does it make if they, or we, have more warheads (than that) left?

Of course, if you hit their C3, you eliminate the ability of something corresponding to “the Russian government” to control the world, or you, or itself. Is that good? (with Russian warheads remaining in various land and sea units). (You also lose the ability to negotiate, bargain with any centralized authority, to threaten or coerce or end the war...) (But no matter: your own C3 is going to be gone too, anyway. It’s going to be a wild world, for the surviving subs and launch control centers on both sides.)

It really doesn’t make any difference to the postwar world, which side was “superior” to start with in either first-strike or second-strike capability, at levels anything like current ones (i.e., even 90% less). (We weren’t going to “win” in Vietnam with twice the force we had, or be forced out with 90% less: stalemate was pretty robust. There was no military solution to achieving our objectives in Vietnam: or Afghanistan; or now, Syria (though Biden is quoted today as saying that will achieve a military solution there, not a political solution.)

You can’t reduce damage to either society by their FS, below the level of the total destruction of their society (even ignoring nuclear winter). (Without nuclear winter, you don’t get the total destruction of all the societies in the world, especially in the southern hemisphere. And nuclear winter gives you a more total destruction of the US and Russia, beyond destruction of organized society to the destruction of nearly all the people. It also wipes out any distinction—even this one—between the results of first and second strike, which should be important, but so far had not affected postures.) (The obdurate, obtuse, dangerous observation: “Damage to us is **less** with a first strike; and to them with theirs.” 183-84 Scheer: Kupperman, Chipman. (The answering question is not, best, “how much less?” but “what will be left? After a first strike.” (after either a first or second strike; for either side).

Then: For what purpose, benefit, are we taking any risk of this coming about? “Well, for freedom, the American way, independence, liberty.” But what alternative ways of guarding these values is this approach being compared to? Being preferred to?

(It's better for the MIC, and those that depend on it; and empire, hegemony. (Not really freedom, except by the argument—Acheson?—that our freedom (capitalist system) depends on empire and hegemony.) Are either of these benefits worth the risk? (It's greater than zero, greater than people think, even experts: though not, perhaps, "almost certain" ("over time")).

[Kennan: denies that "a nuclear explosive is a proper weapon." {Against a NWS! Why not regard it, in this role, as equivalent, both practically and morally, to BW: uncontrollable and potentially unlimited in effect (in fact, actually unlimited in the nuclear case, in a two-sided US-Russian war, or any one involving several hundred weapons—not a thousand or more (of our currently more than 8000 operational weapons: all larger than Hiroshima.) "It can serve no useful purpose."

[McN says: except to deter nuclear attack. BUT that means, in attacks: in threats, it can serve lots of useful purposes, or can be believed to. So why don't we threaten BW? Because it can't "limit damage" (quickly enough to prevent launch? Because we have nucs? (But BW could be the poor man's nuc, or terrorist's nuc...)] Kennan (RS 189) talks of the "true uses of warfare, and the true usefulness of weaponry" (which nucs lack, he says).

[Velikhov points out to RS that our system made mistakes, including MIRVing. He hints also that "parity" or (Kennan) "essential equivalence" was a mistake for their system. Yes. (Especially when it meant numerical superiority in ICBM warheads—but that was a result of our MIRVing, followed by them (on heavier missiles!). (As PSR used to say, it's like having more matches in a rivalry in a room up to your knees in gasoline.

More triggers to a DM than the other's DM, when both have dozens or hundreds of triggers. How about: a more finely filed-down hair-trigger (or, lack of a safety) on your pistol than your opponent's, in a Western show-down? (Neither can actually kill the other before he fires—like a neutron bomb or BW. The Western analogy is misleading, because in the Western you CAN "disarm" the other (like the Lone Ranger) or kill him dead if you fire first: **that has not been possible between the US and SU since 1964 (or before that, with respect to our European hostages, if we cared).**

Kennan points out that (190) that the American public has been led to believe that our nuclear weapons have always been necessary—and are still necessary—to deter the Russian monsters from attacking us with nuclear weapons. That was not true at all for the first twenty years of our nuclear buildup: ours came first, before the Russians, and there was no danger at all of a Russian nuclear attack on us.

It is true (he points out) that there is such a danger now, and, he says, that is due **entirely** to our own deployment on our own territory (pointed at them) and our nuclear policies of threats. We would be safer right now if we had no such weapons on our territory. (Still a danger of decap given our weapons abroad, and threats).

What insiders knew as the threat from Russia was from their ability to invade West Europe, partly from their occupation of East Europe. But that was always enormously exaggerated, and the policy of threatening and preparing mutual suicide to deter it was the (my characterization) most irresponsible, reckless, immoral act of supposed "defense" in human history. (Samson Option). It will be very lucky, a miracle, if we transcend this solution eventually, without its blowing our species up in the next century.

Why the exaggeration and the "solution"? For reasons other than our "national security." **US hegemony in Europe.** Reconstruction of Europe propelled by dollars for German rearmament under US control and presence, US "protectorate" of West Europe compensated by hegemony. (And **an alternative to German nuclear weapons**, which would have solved the "deterrence" problem at very much lower cost and deployment, without buildup of a nuclear winter capability. Granted, that would come with its own problems: which demand analysis.) Another alternative: European independence (of US hegemony and presence).